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A NEW MODEL FOR ADDRESSING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN 
COLLABORATIVE CLINICAL TRIALS 
 
ANDREA J. POMA 
Grand Valley State University 
 
Abstract 
The acceleration of technological change, public policy, economic forces, and increased 
collaboration between research institutions and industrial sponsors has dramatically increased 
potential conflicts of interest (COIs) in collaborative clinical trials (CCTs). This paper includes 
a short history of CCTs and describes the forces affecting public policy and increased 
collaboration and COIs. Current methods of identifying and addressing COIs will be described, 
as well as the shortcomings of these methods. Finally, a new, fully-transparent model for 
addressing COIs will be presented which protects human research subjects, end-users of 
technologies, and the scientific integrity in the clinical trials process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
   How are new medications developed and brought to market in order to treat the pain and 
diseases of the public? The answer is longer than all of the bound volumes of books in your local 
library; in fact, we continue to spend vast resources on the search for new methods to understand 
the human body and the ailments it suffers. There are many philosophies, methods, and models 
used by academics and caregivers to treat patients. In the United States, one requirement in the 
process of making a new medicine available to the public is always the same -- at some point, the 
medicine must be tested on a human subject. 
   Testing on human subjects has proven to be dangerous not only physically, but ethically. In the 
quest for scientific progress, we have committed unethical experiments on human subjects 
without their informed consent. Positive outcomes did result, such as in the case of Edward 
Jenner's immunization experimentation on children (leading to the smallpox vaccination), and 
some experiments seem less dangerous, such as the Vipeholm experiments, in which mental 
patients in Sweden's Vipeholm Mental Hospital were fed large amounts of sweets to determine 
dental effects. These cases will never balance the scales on the side of good when contrasted 
with infamous and repugnant experimentation, such as Nazi sterilization experiments on Jewish 
and Gypsy prisoners. Lest U.S. readers believe that such experiments have only occurred on 
foreign soil, we must also recall U.S. experimentation with syphilis on poor minorities (the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment) which continued through the 1970s, and the recently-revealed 
syphilis research performed by U.S. scientists on Guatemalan mental patients in the late 1940s. 
   It must give us hope that public scrutiny and public policy have determined that human 
subjects research must be performed under strict guidelines to protect the rights and safety of 
those subjects. A variety of codified legislation serves to protect and regulate human subjects 
research in the U.S., most notably 42 CFR Part 50 and 45 CFR Part 95, administered by the 
Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"). These regulations, passed in 1995, 
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require updating and revision now because of the increased incidence of conflicts of interest 
related to clinical trials. 
   The author notes that there are many other instances of human subjects research in the social 
sciences and other fields, but chooses to limit this paper to human subjects research in terms of 
clinical trials performed collaboratively between research institutions and industrial sponsors 
(referred to herein as "collaborative clinical trials" or "CCTs"), which involve a new drug or 
medical device ("technology") which is being tested on human subjects. There are many 
stakeholders involved in the CCT process: academic researchers, focused on learning about the 
drug, device, mechanism or mode of action, or the disease itself; the institution(s), focused on 
supporting life-changing research, increasing public opinion, financing further research or future 
students; the physicians and other caregivers, providing direct patient care and earning their 
wages; the patients themselves, many times having failed all other treatments and in end-stage 
terminal disease; and finally, pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies, often the sponsors of 
research and which carry much of the burden of cost in conducting CCT. Regulatory bodies 
involved in CCT include Institutional Review Boards ("IRBs"), specific to each organization 
having a part in the CCT and various federal agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration 
("FDA"), DHHS, and other public and private sponsors. Finally, should the drug or medical 
device have been conceived by an employee at a public or nonprofit research institution, that 
institution's technology transfer office will be actively engaged in trying to commercialize the 
technology. 
   In an environment of constant collaboration, constant change, and conflicting values (i.e., 
valuing quick translation of a new technology to market versus valuing pedagogy or strict pursuit 
of basic science), it is not surprising that the regulations and codes of ethics governing human 
subjects research should be regularly tested in actual CCT practice. The acceleration of 
technological change, economic forces, and push for collaboration by public policy have 
dramatically increased potential conflicts of interest ("COIs"), a relatively nascent issue in CCTs 
which scholars, CCT participants, public policy advisors, and the public agree must be developed 
and institutionalized to protect human subjects in CCTs, end-users of technologies, and the 
integrity of scientific research. 
   This paper will give the reader a short history of CCTs over the past three decades, including 
the forces affecting public policy and increased collaboration in CCTs. Current methods of 
identifying and addressing COIs will be described, as well as the shortcomings of these methods. 
Proposed rule changes by DHHS and other scholars will be summarized, and finally, a new 
model incorporating many of these proposed changes and addressing many of the current 
shortcomings will be presented. 
 
Background 
 
   Prior to 1980, intellectual property created by research funded by the federal government was 
owned by the federal government; however, this intellectual property languished in the hands of 
the government, and researchers were not incentivized to create new intellectual property. There 
were three main reasons that led to a change in public policy and the passage of the Bayh-Dole 
Act (P.L. 96-517, Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980). First, as noted by Holbrook 
and Dahl (2004), "Congress recognized that the federal government could not oversee the daily 
commercial management of the intellectual property that was being created at universities as an 
outcome of federal investments in research" (pp. 89-90). In the decade or so leading up to the 
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passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, a lack of action by government workers (probably due to resource 
constraints) in commercializing technology funded by the government, as well as the lack of 
incentives for companies to spend large amounts on R&D without a guarantee of exclusivity 
such as is granted during the patent process. 
   Second, the federal government did, on occasion, grant the rights to some patent applications to 
research institutions, but the process of negotiating these transfers of rights was time consuming 
and cumbersome. According to Litan (2007), "Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 
largely to address this problem…" (p. 6); however, prior to enacting the Bayh-Dole Act, the 
National Institutes of Health had implemented a quasi-Bayh-Dole system called the Institutional 
Patent Agreement (IPA) program, in which the NIH granted some universities with technology 
transfer offices the right to commercialize some technologies; however, this was an agency 
program and not statutorily guaranteed, and so was halted in the late 1970s. 
   Finally, it was becoming apparent that the U.S. was having a decreased technological 
economic impact in comparison to the rest of world. Gatter (2003) notes, "federal policy makers 
were concerned that the United States was lagging behind Japan in transforming the results of 
scientific research into commercial products, and they blamed this shortcoming in part on the 
face that the results of publicly funded research were, at that time, public intellectual property" 
(p. 334). Industry, which recognized the risks and challenges of the process of commercializing 
nascent technology, had no incentive to spend vast resources developing an early-stage 
technology with no guarantee of exclusivity when the final product went to market.  
   The Bayh-Dole Act was enacted in 1980, and with this legislation, research institutions and 
their newly-created technology transfer offices filled the gaps left by a government unable and 
unwilling to commercialize intellectual property, and focused attention upon realizing economic 
benefit from the intellectual property developed by their faculty members. Specifically, the Act 
created a uniform public policy for the public agencies that funded research, which required that 
these agencies allow the recipients of these funds (nonprofits and small businesses) to retain title 
to inventions. In fact, the recipients of those funds are encouraged to file patents on those 
inventions, as well as to collaborate with commercial partners ("technology transfer"). 
   Public policy since 1980 has encouraged industry-academic collaborations and industry 
funding, resulting in increased conflicts of interest. Along with the direct research institution- 
industry interactions necessitated by Bayh-Dole, the increased interaction between research 
institutions and industry is also a result of another public policy decision to decrease public 
funding of research institutions and allow private, industrial funding to take its place. Figure 1 
below shows that trends in funding over the past thirty years have dramatically changed, making 
industry the majority funder of research and development. 
   The public policy success, measured in economic terms, of the Bayh-Dole Act is well-
established. The Association of University Technology Managers estimates the royalties 
collected by universities during FY 2000 at over $1 billion, with 368 spin-off companies 
established that year alone (Duderstadt, 2004, p. 58). In an editorial piece written in 2002, 
popular magazine The Economist wrote, "[m]ore than anything, this single policy measure 
helped to reverse America's precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance" (2002). On the 30th 
anniversary of the Bayh-Dole Act, Senator Birch Bayh (with Joseph Allen and Howard Bremer) 
wrote, "[t]he Bayh-Dole Act works because it aligns the interest of the taxpaying public, the 
federal government, research universities…and private sector developers transforming 
government supported research into useable products" (2009, p. 1). Bayh, Allen, and Bremer 
also (2009) summarized the economic impact of the Bayh-Dole Act over the period of 1996 
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through 2007: a $187 billion impact on U.S. Gross Domestic Product, a $457 billion impact on 
U.S gross industrial output, and over 279,000 new jobs created (p.1).  
 
Figure 1: Trends in research funding and licenses/options. 
 
Figure shows executed by U.S. hospitals, research institutes, and universities. Sources. National Science Foundation, 
Division of Science Resources Statistics, AUTM STATT survey data. Trends in federal and nonfederal research and 
development expenditures are shown as a percentage of total research and development. Options/licenses executed 
are numbers in hundreds. 
 
   Many well-known medicines and medical devices were created and developed using the 
collaborative Bayh-Dole model, including coumarin (Coumadin™) and warfarin, widely 
prescribed blood thinners for treating cardiovascular diseases (Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation), paricalcitol (Zemplar™) as treatment for bone diseases (WARF), cisplatin, a 
widely used chemotherapeutic agent (Michigan State University), and synthetic taxol, a first-line 
breast cancer treatment (Florida State University). The inventive process used to isolate human 
embryonic stem cells, which holds enormous potential for accelerating drug discovery, also came 
out of WARF, and the Hepatitis B vaccine (University of Rochester) and the prostate-specific 
antigen test (New York Health Department and Roswell Park Cancer Institute) were also 
generated from this university-industry collaborative model. 
   There can be no question that the public policy created by the Bayh-Dole Act and decreased 
federal funding for research has been invaluable in the advances in medical science, has caused 
economic growth, and perhaps has caused research to occur which has saved countless lives; 
however, the increased inter-relationship between industrial interests and academic interests, and 
the decreased intervention of public policy over the past thirty years caused a dramatic increase 
in COIs and potential harm to human subjects.  
   The most famous recent case of a COI resulting in harm to a human subject is the case of Jesse 
Gelsinger, an eighteen-year-old patient who died in 1999 while participating in a clinical trial at 
the University of Pennsylvania. Gatter (2003) finds "[t]he study's principle investigator and the 
University held equity positions worth millions of dollars in a company that owned exclusive 
commercial rights to the results of the research, and these financial interests allegedly caused the 
researcher and the institution to take unjustifiable risks with Mr. Gelsinger's life" (p. 330). Gatter 
(2003) also notes that "financial conflicts of interests are an outgrowth of federal technology 
transfer policy, which has successfully employed market incentives to make researchers and their 
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institutions more responsible the needs of corporations creating commercial medical products" 
(p. 334). 
   Not only have the incidences of COIs increased, but scrutiny of the issue has increased as well. 
The past fifteen years have seen an exponential increase in publications and studies of COIs, 
especially in relation to CCTs. 
 
Figure 2. Trend in Web of Science Publications on Conflicts of Interest 
 
Source. Thomson Innovation search using query syntax "TI=("conflict* of interest" or "conflict*-of-interest") AND 
(TF>=(1991) AND TF<=(2011)) AND ALL=(clinic* or medic*)," performed on April 18, 2011. Date limits were 
used to determine the total number of citations present each year from 1991 to the current date. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
   This paper is based entirely upon a review of relevant literature, not on original empirical 
research. The relevant literature consisted of scholarly articles, books, editorial opinions, and 
popular articles. The author used Thomson Innovation to conduct a search of Web of Science 
articles over the period of 1991 through the present. The search syntax used was "TI=("conflict* 
of interest" or "conflict*-of-interest") AND (TF>=(1991) AND TF<=(2011)) AND 
ALL=(clinic* or medic*)." From the results of this search and the contents of some of the 
articles, the author retrieved further literature through Grand Valley State University's electronic 
article searching tool, Summit, available at http://gvsu.edu/library/. The author also used Google 
to direct her to original source material of U.S. government regulations, as well as resources 
made available through the Association of University Technology Managers at 
http://www.autm.net/. The scope of the literature review for this paper was preliminary and 
should only be used as the basis for further research. The author also notes that the new model 
proposed herein is a compilation of other scholar's proposals and further original, empirical 
research needs to be done to substantiate the suggestions made in each section of the new model. 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
   "Conflict of interest" issues are those issues which have the potential for bias, or have could 
have the appearance of bias. Warner and Gluck's definition is simple and concise: a "conflict of 
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interest refers to a situation in which it appears that the researcher's financial or other personal 
interest could significantly affect the design, conduct, or reporting of research" (2003, p. 37). 
Thompson (1993) defines a conflict of interest as "a set of conditions in which professional 
judgment concerning a primary interest (such as a patient's welfare or the validity of the 
research) tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain)" (p. 573). 
Although financial COIs are the most easily identifiable, other COIs may exist, such as those 
based on a power relationship (this could include situations in which a tenured researcher 
pressures an inexperienced technician to manipulate research results, or when a physician 
pressures a patient to participate in his or her research). Common scenarios (and this list is by no 
means limited to the following scenarios) in which an individual researcher might have a COI 
include when the researcher is paid as a consultant by an industry sponsor of his or her research 
in a CCT; when the researcher owns equity in an industry sponsor of the CCT, and when the 
researcher is an inventor of the technology being researched and thus will be a beneficiary of 
expected royalty payments from the sale of the technology. Research institutions also can have 
COIs, such as when they are the owners and beneficiaries of expected royalty payments from the 
sale of technology developed at the research institution, when they own equity in an industry 
sponsor, or when they are the potential recipient of media scrutiny as a result of CCTs.  
 
Issues of Identification of COIs 
 
   Most research institutions have policies of self-disclosure by researchers who plan on engaging 
in research in which a conflict of interest may be present. For example, most research institutions 
require that researchers fill out conflict of interest disclosures annually, and update the disclosure 
within a specified time period if a new conflict arises. Titus, Wells, and Rhoades (2008) 
conducted a survey of investigators at research institutions to determine how often research 
misconduct was actually reported; the findings indicate significant under-reporting, and one 
cause is institutional culture. Although many institutions have conflict of interest policies, 
"leaders of institutions may also have concerns about handling research misconduct…because 
public image is important…some may try to minimize reporting and keep unfavorable 
information from reaching the [Office of Research Integrity] and the press" (Titus, Wells, & 
Rhoades, 2008, p. 981). Many conflict of interest situations could be mitigated by research 
institution policies, but often are not and the Office of Research Integrity (the federal agency 
charged with maintaining the integrity of institutions receiving federal funding from the 
Department of Health and Human Services) found in 2000 that "only 29% of institutional 
misconduct policies explicitly obligate members to report scientific misconduct" and an analysis 
of the institutional investigations reported by the Office of Research Integrity indicates that a 
very small proportion of research misconduct is actually reported (p. 982). Warner and Gluck 
(2003) conducted a meta-analysis of ten years of literature and find that "The rate of potential 
conflicts of interest for researchers appears to be at least 30% in some situations…and the rate of 
disclosure of conflicts of interest is as low as 2%," (p. 36). Ambiguity and lack of uniformity in 
standards for disclosure of conflicts of interest seriously undermines the effectiveness of COI 
policies, both individually and institutionally. 
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Bias in Designing, Reporting, and Publishing Clinical Trials 
    
   Increasingly, publication and reporting bias is suspected in medical and scientific literature. 
"Reporting bias" occurs when the nature of scientific results is reported in a skewed manner, and 
"publication bias" can occur when negative results are either not published or published after a 
considerable delay. Reporting and publication bias have the potential of harming end-product 
customers, which may be better informed if provided with all relevant information, instead of 
only the information required by the FDA for drug or device approval. 
   According to McGauran et al. (2010), reporting bias can be seen when "evidence tends to 
overestimate efficacy and underestimate safety risks," (p. 9), and publication bias. Many 
researchers studying incidences of reporting and publication bias have found empirical and 
anecdotal evidence to support this trend (McGauran, et al., 2010). Bekelman, Li, and Gross 
(2003) conducted a broad analysis of original, quantitative studies, and found "a significantly 
significant association between industry sponsorship and pro-industry conclusions" (p. 454). 
These pro-industry conclusions could be the result of inappropriate study designs, reporting bias, 
or publication bias (occurrence of positive experimental results being published more often than 
negative experimental results). 
   COIs have the potential to bias not only individual researchers and physicians directly, during 
interactions with patients, but indirectly, through bias in the process and performance of CCTs. 
Angell (2004) explains how clinical trials happen: "[b]ecause pharmaceutical companies do not 
have direct access to human subjects, they have traditionally contracted with academic 
researchers to conduct trials on patients in teaching hospitals…[t]here is now strong evidence 
that the studies themselves are biased by drug-company influence. Industry-supported research is 
far more likely to be favorable to the sponsors' products than is National Institutes of Health 
supported research" (pp. 127-128). Significant correlation exists between clinical trials 
conducted with pharmaceutical industry involvement and positive results (Peppercorn et al., 
2007; Bekelman, Li, & Gross, 2003.) "Given the commercial interest that industry sponsors have 
in the outcome of the research they sponsor [Food and Drug Administration approval of 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices], their sponsorship can create a potential conflict of interest" 
(Gatter, 2003, p. 347). 
 
Mitigating Bias Resulting from COIs 
 
   One of the primary methods to mitigate the risk of bias in research is through peer review; that 
is, publication in a peer-reviewed journal allows other researchers to replicate research in order 
to confirm or disprove the original researcher's findings. Peer review is central to the idea of 
research integrity, and critical to the issue of public trust. Most legal contracts between research 
institutions and industry will preserve a researcher's right to publish but in reality, Bodenheimer 
(2000) writes that some multicenter drug trials might have publication committees or industry 
funders which take over the writing of publications, shepherding such publications through the 
actual researchers to manipulate the actual information which finally gets published for peer 
review (p. 4). 
   While clinical trials (with the exception of Phase 1 drug trials) are required to be registered and 
published on ClinicalTrials.gov, only a small set of results are required to be published. Growing 
scrutiny upon unreported safety issues and efficacy data have recently caused pharmaceutical 
research and development companies, pharmaceutical industry organizations, and some 
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individual companies to commit to publishing their study results (McGauran et al., 2010, pp. 9-
10). 
 
Regulatory Oversight for COIs 
 
   The FDA, which has oversight over clinical trials for medicines and medical devices tested on 
human patients, has specific regulations for clinical trials on human subjects. While the 
sponsor(s) of the trial (usually industry) must collect information on financial relationships from 
research investigators before the trial begins, the FDA does not review the financial relationship 
information until after the trial ends and often does not enforce its own regulations, (Office of the 
Inspector General, 2009, p. 3). 
   Current DHHS regulations, which apply only to institutions that accept federal funding for 
research, "require institutions to include precautions against conflicts of interest on the part of 
those involved in the inquiry or investigation" itself (Department of Health and Human Services, 
2005). Institutions are not required to identify all potential conflicts of interest, however. The 
current de minimus threshold for disclosure of significant financial interests is $10,000, and 
many exclusions can apply. Identified conflicts of interested are not regulated by DHHS; the 
research institution must only assure the DHHS that the conflict is being managed. According to 
Johns (2003), "no laws or regulations directly govern the financial conflicts of interest of 
institutions or institutional decision makers" (p. 742). Some sectors of research have been 
legislated, such as the Public Health Service and the Food and Drug Administration, but there is 
no overarching set of laws. According to Gatter, current conflict of interest guidelines by the 
federal government are "heavy on procedure, light on substance" (2003, p. 349). Huang and 
Hadian also conclude that uniformity in standards, interpretation, and application are needed to 
better protect human subjects (2006, p. 1). 
   For these reasons, DHHS has published major proposed changes to its financial conflict of 
interest regulations in May of 2010 (Federal Register, FR Doc. 2010–11885). These regulations 
are both heavier on procedure and heavier in substance: 
• The de minimus threshold for significant financial interests is lowered to $5,000 and 
there are fewer exclusions. 
• The research institution is required to publically disclose identified potential 
conflicts of interest (presumably, this is to give the public the visibility to see the 
source of funding so that they may judge whether the research is biased). 
• The research institution is required to create a specific management plan for dealing 
with identified conflicts of interest (and report elements of the plan to the Public 
Health Service). 
 
While changes to the Public Health Services' conflict of interest policies will be useful in 
managing recipients of federal funds, they still assign research institutions the responsibility of 
management and enforcement. 
 
Other Methods Used and Proposed for Managing COIs 
 
   In the context of promoting transparency for professional medical associations, Rothman et al. 
(2009) recommend publishing the amount or portion of their operating budget that comes from 
industry (pp.1368-69), and proposes that "research funds from industry…should go to a 
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[professional medical association's] central repository or committee…" (p. 1370). While these 
ideas are intriguing, they may be too drastic a change to the current infrastructure and process by 
which research institutions operate. 
   Holmes et al. (2004) notes that some committees might manage COIs "by building firewalls 
between the inventor and any research involving his or her device or compound;" among other 
methods of managing COIs (p. 230). Holmes also recommends that "written policies must 
provide guidelines for disclosure or recusal from decision-making processes for individuals who 
are conflicted" (p. 232), and to either "preclude clinical research with potential conflict from 
occurring at the institution," or have "clear firewalls between investment decision making 
committees, technology transfer, and the research arm of the institution" (p. 232). While most 
institutions now have written COI policies and may use firewalls as a method of managing COIs, 
without constant reminder of COI policies, public enforcement actions, or publication of 
management plans, various stakeholders can either "fall under the radar" or may not have access 
to information that is relevant to evaluating CCTs. 
   Because the potential for COIs at the institutional level may be even more harmful to the 
public, whether by creating an institutional culture wherein individual conflicts are tolerated or 
through lack of management of specific conflict of interest situations, self-regulation by research 
institutions is inherently unwise. As far as the author knows, the only mechanism to counteract 
these problems is to exclude members of a COI-regulating body which are likely to be more 
biased than others. Unfortunately, if all members and alternate members of that body are 
affiliated with a research institution, and the research institution stands to benefit from a financial 
relationship, it becomes hard to characterize any management plan as unbiased. In the case of 
IRBs, federal regulations require an unaffiliated layperson to be a member of each IRB, which 
may mitigate some of the risk of this situation. 
 
 
A NEW MODEL FOR ADDRESSING COIs IN COLLABORATIVE CLINIAL TRIALS 
 
   We must look at this issue as the result of and a problem for public policy. About thirty years 
ago, the federal government decided to accelerate the commercialization of basic and applied 
research by taking a hands-off approach and letting public and nonprofit research organizations 
interact directly with industry. This public policy decision worked, but had the unintended 
consequence of dramatically increasing financial conflicts of interest, thus endangering public 
trust in research integrity, which is essential for maintaining the pace of acceleration without 
returning to the staleness of the pre-1980s. An underlying issue which has not been addressed on 
the national policy level is the reliance of research institutions on industry funding. Specific 
prohibitions or management plans for specific financial conflicts of interest do not "address the 
financial conflict of interest that could be created when researchers and their institutions rely on 
private industry to fund a significant portion of their human subjects research" (Gatter, 2003, p. 
367). National policy could influence this issue by issuing advice, a guideline threshold, or 
substantive help in reducing the portion of industry funding individual institutions rely upon to 
fund their research programs. The following model is collaborative, but it would need 
publication and guidance on a national policy level. The first step is creating a uniform national 
policy, from which dialogue between the stakeholders can begin. For this reason, the author 
advocates using the proposed DHHS rules as a standard for all organizations involved in CCTs. 
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Standardization of COI guidelines 
 
   Perhaps the most disquieting aspect of the discussion of COIs and clinical trials is that there are 
so many different guidelines for identifying and managing them. It seems worrisome, as a 
prospective clinical trial subject, that a researcher at one institution must disclose a $4,000 
honorarium from his industrial sponsor, while a researcher at another institution does not need to 
disclose the same honorarium because it does not exceed an arbitrary threshold for a 
"significant" financial transaction. 
   Because the PHS required all recipients of federal research funding to have written COI 
policies, there are thousands of different policies in existence. The first step toward standardizing 
and having a true dialogue on "significant" financial or other interests must be to start with a 
single policy document which may be modified as public and scholarly debate progress over 
time. To that end, the proposed rulemaking by the DHHS of 42 CFR Part 50 and 45 CFR Part 94 
should be adopted and incorporated into existing institutional COI policies. According to the 
PHS Analysis of Impacts, (Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 98, may 21, 2010/Proposed Rules, p. 
28700-701), approximately 5,000 institutions would be affected by the proposed changes. 
Inasmuch as many clinical trials are conducted in academic-medical centers and the proposed 
rules incorporate a provision for institutions conducting PHS-funded research to establish a 
legally-enforceable written agreement with any sub-recipient, contractor, or collaborator, to 
comply with PHS regulations or the institution's policy(s). Adoption of the same substantive 
guidelines by the FDA would ensure that clinical trials and non-clinical trials research would be 
subject to the same general definitions and policies, thus reducing confusion and conflicting 
standards. 
   As described above, self-disclosure by researchers is a problem at most institutions for three 
main reasons: 1) researchers do not believe a potential conflict will cause bias in their research, 
2) institutional culture does not embrace full disclosure for publicity-related reasons, and 3) 
varying monetary thresholds and types of conflicts are not standardized across institutions, 
public agencies, or industry. In this proposed model, yearly COI disclosures should ask all 
employees to list all organizations from which the employee receives a W-2 or Form 1099 (or 
any other IRS tax form denoting an income source). This method would not only standardize the 
monetary amount across institutions, but it would simplify employee disclosures for employees 
since they could be timed to coincide with tax season, when all tax forms are readily available 
for input onto a COI disclosure. This standard approach, which must be enforced by all research 
organizations, will institutionalize this yearly disclosure and make the practice rote. This may 
also enable cross-checking with IRS databases for auditing purposes. 
 
Universal Publication of COI Management Plans, Clinical Trial Designs and Results on 
Clinicaltrials.gov 
 
   The recent Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes the Physician Payment 
Sunshine Act" (PL 111-148) which requires drug and medical device manufacturers to disclose 
payments to physicians in a publicly-available Internet resource managed by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. The author suggests that the same standard should be used for 
payments to researchers in CCTs, possibly using the existing government-maintained database of 
clinical trials information, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov. This would enable any member of the 
public to access a specific clinical trial and view any related COI management plans (both 
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institutional and individual), resulting in a transparent and consistent disclosure to the public of 
every clinical trial. 
   In addition to the publication of COI management plans on the Clinicaltrials.gov database, 
legislation should be introduced which requires the complete study design of all clinical trials to 
be disclosed on the database and requires the complete study results to be posted on the database, 
whether the trial was completed, changed during the course of the trial, or not completed. This 
transparency in research design and reporting will ensure that peer scientists can evaluate the 
results of clinical trials based on scientific merit, incorporating knowledge of good scientific 
study design and the influences upon the stakeholders in the clinical trial. 
 
Use of Existing Infrastructure 
 
   As any research administrator or researcher knows, each passing year brings more regulations 
and more burdensome administrative requirements, and each passing year brings less funding for 
meeting these requirements. Thus, any new model to address conflicts of interest must be cost-
effective and not put a greater financial burden on already overtaxed research administration 
systems. For this reason, this new model will use the IRB system already in place in all 
organizations conducting human subjects research to eliminate the necessity of creating another 
administrative department and institutional infrastructure for COI disclosures and management. 
   It is important to note that this model only uses the IRB mechanism for identification and 
management of individual COIs, and identification but not for management of institutional COIs. 
Institutional Review Boards are not immune to the conflicts of interest and numerous studies 
have found that faculty members of IRBs have industry affiliations and indirect pressure to 
facilitate human subjects research which could benefit their institutions (Huang & Hadian, 2006, 
p. 2). 
 
In Cases of Identified COIs, an External IRB or Ethics Consultation Service Should be 
Used to Prepare a Conflict Management Plan and Manage the Plan 
 
Another aspect of this new model to mitigate the shortcomings of institutional COI management 
is the use of an external COI management body or independent committee to manage any 
identified institutional COI. Following the strategy of using existing infrastructure, this author 
would suggest expanding the service offerings of Western IRB and other independent IRB 
service providers to encompass COI management in such instances. Cho et al. (2008) performed 
a pilot program of an ethics consultation service at Stanford University, one of the goals of 
which was to "integrate ethical considerations into the early phases of research planning" (2008, 
p. 1). 
 
Technological Integration of Conflict-Checking Software 
 
   Because the effectiveness of self-disclosure is largely dependent upon the potentially conflicted 
researcher or an individual whistleblower, research institutions should research other methods of 
learning about potential financial conflicts of interest. There are a variety of business software 
solutions which integrate virtually all facets of a corporate environment in order to maintain 
effective systems and enforce compliance. For example, legal firms have utilized both stand-
alone and integrated conflict-checking software for many years; this software can monitor all 
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parties to a lawsuit, attorneys, family members, vendors, employees, and clients. Integrating a 
research institution's human resources systems with its financial systems and either adding an 
existing conflict-of-interest software product or customizing software to fit institutional needs 
would greatly enhance the knowledge available to the IRB assigned to identify COIs. It would 
also make COI identification scalable in large organizations, where multiple IRBs are used for 
different research areas and no single committee can possibly know all of the potential COIs on a 
given CCT. 
 
Areas for Further Research and Exploration 
 
   The legal field has recognized the importance of avoiding COIs for many years, and has 
voluminous materials and resources available for identifying and managing conflicts. The most 
basic of methods to manage a conflict is a "firewall," in which individuals identified as having a 
conflict are excluded from knowledge of or decision-making ability in a specific situation 
(depending on the scope of the conflict). In some situations, lawyers, judges, and even whole law 
firms voluntarily withdraw from or are excluded from participating in cases. Financial systems, 
especially lending and securities industries, are also engaged in constant dialogue about the 
identification and management of conflicts of interest. 
   As noted above, this proposed model has not been the subject of original research, although it 
is supported by literature in the field. Each aspect of the new model should be tested empirically 
for effectiveness, and the cost in terms of time, personnel, and money needed to implement such 
a system should be defined. Finally, the most difficult aspect of seriously evaluating this new 
system will be to engage the stakeholders in CCTs, policymakers, and the public to create a 
unified effort and a new cultural norm: full transparency in all aspects of collaborative clinical 
trials. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
   The tide is already turning as the public, policymakers, associations, and research institutions 
recognize that a lack of oversight and inability to enforce potential conflicts of interest is eroding 
public trust in research integrity. Gatter (2003) writes, "one person's financial conflict of interest 
is another's example of efficient technology transfer" (p. 341). Public policy makers must weigh 
the trade-offs between efficiency and safety for human subjects. Currently, the scales are tilted 
toward efficiency: effective market incentives for technology transfer have made CCTs an 
economic commodity, and now externalities in the form of potential or real harm to human 
subjects have increased to the point that the public wishes to regulate trade in this commodity. 
   If we study all of the stakeholders, influences, values, and norms in a collaborative clinical 
trial, we will never fail to identify conflicts of interest; however, as a society we are collectively 
committed to protecting human research subjects, end-users of technologies, and the scientific 
integrity. The new model proposed in this paper is fully transparent, and whether individual 
components of the model are judged to address the current issues in CCTs or not, a holistic 
vision of full transparency of researchers, industry, and universities will enable human subjects 
to make informed decisions to participate in clinical trials. Full transparency will enable 
members of the public and legislators to understand the forces affecting collaborative clinical 
trials and to maintain control over ethical boundaries. Finally, institutionalization of a new 
cultural norm - transparency in all aspects of collaborative clinical trials - will enable scientists to 
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evaluate the content of those CCTs with a full knowledge of all factors – enabling peer review in 
its most candid form and ensuring the integrity of scientific research. 
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